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Abstract 
 
This paper uses an extensive unique dataset to investigate the justification of government 
subsidies for minor league baseball teams and stadiums by measuring pecuniary gains in a local 
economy.  Specifically, a dynamic panel data model incorporating 238 Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas that hosted affiliated or independent minor league teams between 1985 and 2006 shows 
that AAA teams, A+ teams, AA stadiums, and rookie stadiums are all associated with significant 
positive effects on the change in local per capita income.  The presence of positive effects is 
strikingly different from decades of non-positive results at the major league level.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Advocates of public stadium subsidies claim professional sports teams produce positive 
production and consumption externalities in a local economy.  Theoretically, these externalities 
should manifest themselves through pecuniary increases in incomes, jobs, and taxes that could 
offset the public sector contribution, thus justifying government expenditures on efficiency 
grounds.  Although research on major league sports shows these pecuniary effects are non-
positive (e.g. Coates & Humphreys, 1999; Miller, 2002; Baade, Baumann, & Matheson, 2008) 
little empirical inquiry has been conducted in other sports that receive public subsidies. 
A stadium building boom that resulted in a dramatic increase in both the cost and public 
contribution towards minor league baseball stadiums provides an interesting context in which to 
conduct economic policy research.  Based on the unsupported claims of major league teams, 
minor league baseball team owners also maintain ex ante that new ballparks will increase 
employment, tax revenues, and other private economic development.  Yet, no research has 
substantiated or refuted these assertions at the minor league level.   
The purpose of this research is to remedy this gap in the literature by determining the 
effects of minor league teams and their stadiums on local economies. An extensive database is 
used to investigate claims of positive pecuniary benefits by analyzing changes in local per capita 
income in 238 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MiSAs) that hosted minor league teams between 1985 and 2006.  
This research acknowledges that minor league baseball is not a homogenous good.  
Structurally diverse classifications imply differential contributions to local economic well-being.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether differences exist between minor 
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league baseball and Major League Baseball (MLB), between independent and affiliated teams, 
and within affiliated classifications (AAA, AA, A, and rookie). 
While this research is primarily driven by the need to provide ex post analysis of 
government investment in minor league baseball, a variety of other contributions are made. 
First, the smaller towns where minor league baseball teams are located help avoid an 
econometric issue that has plagued major league research.  Because major league teams are 
located in roughly the 50 largest metro areas, there is a collinearity problem between population 
and the presence of a team.  On the other hand, between 1980 and 2007 there were 269 metro 
areas that hosted a minor league baseball team with 2006 population ranging from 15,469 to 18.8 
million. Thus, minor league baseball offers the opportunity to dramatically increase not only the 
variance in population but also the size of the sample.  Next, although Baade et al. (2008) point 
out that the enormity of major metropolitan areas makes it difficult to find effects due to normal 
fluctuations in the regional economy, this problem should be partially alleviated in minor league 
baseball because metropolitan areas are generally smaller.  Because the effect of a team may be 
smaller as well it may be theoretically ambiguous, ex ante, whether minor league teams are a 
larger or smaller portion of the economy than major league teams are.  With 269 metro areas in 
the sample, at minimum there should be a wide variation in the degree to which teams are either 
a large or small part of the local economy.  
Third, the minor league baseball context extends the current major league literature to a 
new and relevant segment of U.S. sports.  Although there were several critical, but non-
econometric, studies on the potential for minor league teams to affect local economics in the 
mid-1990’s (Baade & Sanderson, 1997b; Colclough, Daellenbach, & Sherony, 1994; Johnson, 
1995; Rosentraub & Swindell, 1991), it is only in recent years that econometric interest in minor 
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league baseball has begun (e.g. Cebula, Toma, & Carmichael, 2009; Gitter & Rhoads, 2010, 
2011; Winfree, 2009) although none of these studies focus on economic impact.   In 1997, Baade 
and Sanderson claimed that econometric analysis of minor league baseball was not possible 
because of the non-existence of data for small communities.  Fortunately, the opposite is now 
true and data is so freely available, even for small communities, that this research contains all but 
five minor league teams that played in the U.S. in a 22-year period.   
Finally, this research also helps inform the current debate on public funding for minor 
league stadiums by evaluating the veracity of claims made by stadium proponents.  With 
hundreds of millions of public dollars spent each year on minor league baseball stadiums, the 
economic effects of teams on communities have important policy implications.  
II. Theory and Literature 
Common arguments for public subsidization involve claims that teams generate positive 
production externalities that result in economic growth effects in the local economy.  Indeed the 
classic claim is that the bars and restaurants surrounding a stadium will be full of new patrons 
spending more money and generating new sales tax revenues.  These busy establishments will 
hire more employees or raise salaries for existing employees.  In short, the positive production 
externalities are claimed to affect multiple aspects of a local economy.  Yet, the vast majority of 
academic research in this area has found non-positive effects on income (Baade & Dye, 1990; 
Baade, 1996; Coates & Humphreys, 1999, 2001, 2003; Matheson & Baade, 2005; Lertwachara & 
Cochran, 2007), employment (Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, & Mullins, 1994; Baade, 1996; 
Baade & Sanderson, 1997a; Hudson, 1999; Miller, 2002; Coates & Humphreys, 2003), sales tax 
revenues (Rosentraub & Nunn, 1978; Coates & Depken, 2006; Baade et al., 2008), and spending 
(Zipp, 1996).   
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Since the study at hand operationalizes pecuniary gains through a change in per capita 
income, a more thorough discussion of the major league research on income is warranted.  To 
begin, Baade and Dye (1990) found an insignificant effect of a new stadium on MSA personal 
income in nine major league cities between 1965 and 1983.  Baade (1996) extended this to 
include all major league cities between 1958 and 1987 and still found insignificant results for all 
cities except Indianapolis (positive) and Baltimore (negative).  Using a reduced form equation 
but obtaining similar results, Coates and Humphreys (1999) analyzed all major league cities 
between 1969 and 1994 and found the effect of a new team or stadium was insignificant although 
there were a few significant results.  For example, the entrance of a basketball franchise 
increased per capita income by $67 but a new basketball arena decreased it by $73 for an overall 
loss in per capita income.  Finally, Santo (2005) created a more modern dataset (1984-2001), but 
utilized Baade and Dye’s (1990) original methodology, and found many positive effects of 
stadiums and teams on local area income, although a few negative effects were found as well.  
Santo believes his results, which conflict so strongly with previous research, result from different 
characteristics of new modern stadiums as well as their geographical locations in urban centers.   
The positive results obtained by Santo are not necessarily an anomaly.  Teams can 
theoretically affect income if they generate substantial new spending by out-of-area residents or 
discourage residents from spending outside the local economy.  Both of these are more likely to 
occur in geographically isolated metro areas, especially small cities with few other entertainment 
options.  Professional teams can also affect income if they effectively utilize their stadium to host 
a high number of events that draw new visitor spending, induce little or no crowding out effects, 
and generate low levels of leakages. 
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Instead of the claimed positive pecuniary gains to a local economy, the presence of a 
team or a stadium leads to neutral or negative changes primarily due to leakages and substitution.  
Team owners, players, concessionaires, and other recipients of consumer expenditures tend to 
remove those dollars from the local economy (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000, 2002).  Because 
professional sports teams spend approximately 60% of their revenues on player payroll, a 
considerable amount of new spending flows out of the regional economy due to high tax rates, 
high savings rates, and the non-local permanent residences of players.   
Crowding out can take the form of locals not venturing near a stadium when a game is 
taking place, normal business or leisure travelers avoiding a local economy when a large event is 
occurring, or local area residents purposefully leaving the local economy to avoid a mega-event.  
In all of these cases, normal local economic activity is reduced below its regular level, meaning 
any gains from an event must offset the loss in order for the community to simply break even. 
Finally, considerable research at the major league level (Coates & Humphreys, 2001, 
2003; Matheson & Baade, 2005) reveals that when consumers face a budget constraint, spending 
on sports is simply a substitute for spending in other higher multiplier local leisure activities 
(Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). 
III. Minor League Baseball Context 
 Minor League Baseball, previously called the National Association of Professional 
Baseball Leagues, oversees all minor league teams that are affiliated with major league 
franchises.  In 1990, MLB began decreasing its financial contributions to affiliated minor league 
baseball teams.  At the same time, new stadium requirements mandated minor league teams to 
dramatically renovate or build new stadiums in order to retain their major league affiliations.  
The increased financial independence of minor league teams, coupled with more stringent 
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stadium requirements and the dramatically increased costs of purchasing a franchise, resulted in 
an increase in the already booming minor league stadium market, higher prices for new stadiums, 
and larger stadium contributions from communities throughout the U.S.   
Independent leagues are not governed by Minor League Baseball, are free to set their 
own schedules, sign their own players, and were unaffected by the 1990 stadium requirements.  
Yet independent leagues have always struggled with financial viability because they have had to 
cover the entire portion of their expenses with no assistance from major league teams.  Despite 
lower player talent than affiliated teams, independent teams must rely more on player talent, 
wins, promotions, and marketing to drive attendance and therefore revenues to the team.  The 
result is independent leagues tend to exhibit more market volatility, as evidenced in Table 1, and 
stay in a city only 25% as long as an affiliated franchise, on average.           <insert Table 1 here> 
Affiliated minor league baseball teams are not a singular entity.  Minor League Baseball 
governs 19 different minor leagues categorized into classifications where AAA is the highest 
followed by AA, A, and rookie leagues.  Table 2 summarizes some of the differences between 
classifications for all of the teams that played in 2006.  The A leagues were at one time broken 
down into advanced A (or A+), A, and short-season A (or A-).  Although professional baseball 
officially did away with the distinction, its use is important in this research because rookie and 
A- leagues play “short seasons,” which run from June through the end of August, and include 
roughly half as many games as other classifications.  Since the amount of new visitor spending in 
a local economy is a function of the number of games played, these short-season leagues have 
fewer opportunities to generate positive economic effects.  Table 2 also makes clear that some 
classifications (AA and independent) face steep competition from major league teams while 
others (rookie) face none.                                     <insert Table 2 here> 
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Similar to the major leagues, minor league teams often move because of excess demand 
for teams generated from league cartels that limit the supply of teams.  In this context, cities 
compete for teams and contribute millions of dollars for new facilities without any evidence as to 
whether minor league teams and stadiums are wise investments or not.  If major league teams 
have non-positive effects on local per capita income, what can be expected at the minor league 
level? 
Minor league baseball is major league baseball on a small scale.  Teams play shorter 
seasons in smaller ballparks that tend to be located in smaller cities with lower per capita 
incomes.  Minor league teams have operating budgets that pale in comparison to their major 
league affiliates, they employ fewer people, the salaries they pay are much smaller, and the jobs 
are mostly seasonal (Johnson, 1991, 1995).  Although major leagues often import over 50% of 
their total budget from revenue sharing and lucrative national television contracts, the only 
financial inflows attributable to minor league teams are the player salaries paid by major league 
affiliates.  Even these payments are absent in the case of independent leagues.  In addition, the 
minor leagues have lower levels of media exposure and brand association, decreased league 
longevity, more frequent team moves, shorter seasons, and lower quality players producing 
lower quality contests.  If the effect of a major league team on income is insignificant or 
negative, the minor league results should be more so. 
In spite of this inauspicious expectation, it is important to note that minor league baseball 
is not a homogenous product.  Affiliated teams should have a more positive effect than 
independent teams because of higher quality players, stronger history, fewer league and team 
movements, and the benefits of affiliation in branding, increasing attendance, and generating 
media exposure.  Likewise, within classifications the quality of play, season length, population, 
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substitutes, and longevity in a market are distinctly different.  For example, AAA and AA teams 
benefit from large populations (as a proxy for demand), little competition from MLB, and longer 
seasons in larger stadiums.  Given these conditions, it is expected AAA and AA teams will have 
the least negative effect while A and rookie teams are expected to have a more negative effect on 
local per capita income. 
Finally, minor league team owners routinely claim that their product is a local leisure 
activity, not a sporting contest (Johnson, 1995).  If this is truly the case, then a comparison to 
MLB may be less appropriate than a stand-alone evaluation of the degree to which minor league 
baseball can generate new visitor spending.  
IV. PECUNIARY ANALYSIS 
Claims of economic growth effects are tested by measuring the impact of a minor league 
team and its stadium on levels of local per capita income.  The following section provides a 
description of the sample, the model, its variables, and descriptive statistics, followed by the 
statistical method employed, results, and robustness checks. 
Sample 
The data collection process began by identifying all of the teams that played minor league 
baseball between 1980 and 2006.  This included teams in 3 AAA leagues, 3 AA leagues, 7 A 
leagues, 2 advanced rookie leagues, and 22 independent leagues.  Of all of the affiliated and 
independent minor league teams that played in this period, only five were located in cities that 
are not part of an MSA or MiSA.  Likewise, teams playing in 19 Canadian cities were not 
included in the sample.  
The unit of analysis for this research is not a team, but the MSA or MiSA in which each 
team plays.  Thus, 4,495 team-year observations were sorted into over 200 corresponding metro 
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areas.  A team’s MSA is most reflective of its market size and drawing potential when the 
stadium is located near the urban core.  If a team is located in a very far suburb of a large 
metropolitan area the MSA fails to accurately represent the market area of the team and the city 
or county data becomes more appropriate.  For example, in 2003, the Chicago MSA hosted five 
Independent teams and one A team.  The Joliet JackHammers, Cook County Cheetahs, 
Schaumburg Flyers, Gary SouthShore RailCats, Kenosha Mammoths, and Kane County Cougars 
are located 46, 25, 30, 32, 57, and 39 miles, respectively, from Chicago.  While the Chicago 
MSA had a 2003 population of 9.3 million, the county population for each team was 581,199, 
5.3 million, 5.3 million, 484,750, 155,729, and 455,672, respectively.  Therefore, because the 
MSA was chosen as the geographical unit of measure for this analysis, there were simply some 
cases where minor league teams, although technically within the boundaries of the MSA, were 
not appropriately described by MSA data.  Thus, to prevent a small area with a population of 
155,729 people located 57 miles from Chicago as being erroneously treated as a 9.3 million 
person metropolitan area, the following 18 “big” MSAs were removed from the sample: 
Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, 
New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Raleigh, Riverside-San Bernardino, Seattle, St. Louis, 
Tampa, and Washington D.C.1 
                                                 
1 An F-test was performed to statistically test the exclusion of these MSAs.  The restricted 
model included all 256 MSAs while the unrestricted model was a sum of a) the 18 big MSAs 
and b) the 238 non-big MSAs.  F(51, 5526) = 1.639 is significant at p < 0.01 and confirms the 
big and non-big MSAs cannot be well specified with a single coefficient.  Thus, the 
unrestricted model is preferred and the big MSAs are removed from this sample. 
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The first five years of the dataset were ultimately truncated to create honeymoon 
variables (as described in the following section).  This resulted in the loss of 12 metro areas 
which, in addition to the removal of 18 Big metro areas, ultimately provided a final sample of 
238 metro areas in the years between 1985 and 2006. 
Model and Variables 
In order to make a clear comparison between minor league and major league effects, this 
research uses a linear reduced form model first developed by Coates and Humphreys (1999) to 
determine if the presence or absence of a team or its stadium affects the level of per capita 
income in an economy.  Specifically,    
 yjt = β1Xjt + β2Zjt + υj + μt + εjt (1) 
 
where: 
yjt is the real per capita personal income in MSA j at time t 
β1 is a vector of local market parameters to be estimated  
Xjt is a vector of local market variables for each MSA j at time t 
β2 is a vector of sporting parameters to be estimated  
Zjt is a vector of franchise and stadium variables in MSA j at time t 
υj is an MSA j specific fixed-effect  
μt is a time t specific fixed-effect  
εjt is a random disturbance 
 
The model uses city fixed-effects (υj) to control for all time-invariant characteristics that 
are specific to a city and that contribute to levels of real per capita income.  Likewise, a time 
disturbance (μt) captures all city-invariant factors that are specific to a year that affect per capita 
income.   
The dependent variable is real per capita income for each MSA or MiSA adjusted for 
inflation using the consumer price index calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (base year 
2006).  Real per capita income, population, and employment data were obtained from the 
Regional Economic Information System produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.   
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To control for variability unique to each local MSA, a series of local market parameters 
are included in the model.  Again, to be clear, these parameters were chosen to replicate, as 
closely as possible, the model developed by Coates and Humphreys (1999) for clear comparison 
of major and minor league results.  A lagged dependent variable serves to evaluate recent 
changes in the local industrial life cycle and the associated effects on income as suggested by 
product cycle theory (Vernon, 1966).  A rate of employment variable is constructed as a proxy 
for labor demand and should positively affect local per capita income.   
Change in population is a local market variable included to measure growth in a local 
market.  This is especially relevant since many small towns that host minor league teams are 
actually shrinking.  The theoretical relationship between population and per capita income is 
ambiguous though.  Population growth can increase the labor supply which will drive down 
wages and negatively affect local per capita income.  Conversely, population growth can 
increase the demand for products thus increasing labor demand and positively affecting local per 
capita income.     
Stadium capacity measures the degree to which a community can utilize and consume the 
minor league sporting product.  Presumably, a greater ability to consume sport induces a greater 
potential to generate income effects in the local economy.   
The popularity of a parent club should positively affect a minor league team’s ability to 
produce positive economic outcomes in a community to the degree to which it drives visiting 
consumers.  The quality of affiliation is conceptualized as a function of the size of the MLB 
market and the popularity of its MLB team thus, the major league parent club’s current MSA 
population is multiplied by a two year moving average of the previous season win percents (the 
robustness checks, below, investigate alternative specifications of this variable).   
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Finally, the number of professional major league teams in baseball, basketball, hockey, 
and football are controls that should have negative coefficients due to their previously 
established effects on local economies.   
An important hypothesis is that minor league baseball at different levels of play exhibits 
different characteristics.  Thus, the minor league variables differentiate between different league 
levels, affiliated v. independent status, and newness of team and a stadium in a community.   
The actual number of teams at each level of affiliation is included instead of a presence 
dummy because minor league baseball can have multiple teams at the same level in the same 
MSA.  For example, the Tampa-St. Petersburg MSA has hosted four A+ teams from the mid-
1900’s to 2000 including the Clearwater Phillies, Dunedin Blue Jays, St. Petersburg Cardinals 
(later renamed the St. Petersburg Devil Rays), and the Tampa Yankees.  Affiliated teams should 
have a more positive effect on income than independent teams although both may be negative.   
Previous research assumed the newness or “honeymoon” effect of a new stadium lasted 
ten years.  More recent research by Clapp and Hakes (2005) and Leadley and Zygmont (2005) 
suggests the honeymoon effect is considerably shorter.  This research uses a five-year period to 
dummy the effect of a new stadium.  In other words, the variable takes on the value of 1 in the 
year a new stadium is built and the four subsequent years.  The stadium newness dummy should 
be positive.   
Identical coding was used for an entry dummy that measures the newness of a team and 
an exit dummy that measures the years after a team leaves to capture what sport sociologists 
Foster & Hyatt (2007) have identified as the euphoria surrounding a new team and the despair 
associated with a team leaving.  The entry coefficient is expected to be positive and the exit 
negative.  
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for each variable described above.   
<insert Table 3 here> 
Analysis 
 The breadth and depth of this dataset necessitates careful examination of its adherence to 
the classical regression model assumptions.  The degree to which the data deviate from the 
expected form will dictate the best estimator to be used.  To begin, econometric investigation 
revealed no evidence of multicollinearity in the data using either variance inflation factors or the 
correlation matrix.   
Visual inspection with augmented component-plus-residual plots indicates the presence 
of heteroskedastic errors.  A likelihood ratio (LR) test (2 (237) = 4439.61, p < 0.0001) rejects the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  Because this test is sensitive to the assumption of 
normality in the errors, an additional heteroskedasticity test is computed.  Greene (2000, p. 598) 
developed a modified Wald statistic to test for group wise heteroskedasticity in the context of a 
fixed effects model.  The Greene test (2 (238) = 20640.78, p < 0.0001) also rejects the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity suggesting each MSA has its own error variance. 
Using Wooldridge’s (2002, p. 282–283) test for autocorrelation in panel-data models (F(1, 
237) = 9.72, p = 0.002) the null hypothesis of no first order correlation is rejected.  Similarly, a 
panel unit root test developed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) fails to reject the null of unit root 
series (p = 0.925). 
The usual test for contemporaneous correlation in panel data models, the Breusch-Pagan 
LM test (1980), has been shown to over-reject when cross-sectional units (N) are greater than or 
equal to the number of time periods (T), especially with T between 20 and 30 (Pesaran, 2004).  
In this dataset, T=22.  Pesaran’s (2004) cross sectional dependence (CD) test was developed to 
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correct this problem as well as to handle unit root dynamic heterogeneous panels with short T 
and large N, as is the case in this research.  The Pesaran test (2 (238) = 4.466, p < 0.0001) rejects 
the null hypothesis that error terms are independent across cross-sections in the same year.   
Finally, because minor league teams move with a much higher frequency than major 
league teams it is possible that moves take place from cities with lower per capita incomes to 
those with higher per capita incomes.  In addition, per capita income and population may be 
positively correlated.  This implies that larger or wealthier cities are more capable of sustaining a 
minor league franchise and also implies the presence of a minor league team may be endogenous 
in this model specification.  Despite this common belief and concern, a Wu (1973)-Hausman 
(1978) F-test fails to reject the null that each of the minor league presence variables is 
exogenous.  The implication of this is further explored in the discussion section. 
 Ultimately, this is a panel heteroskedastic, autocorrelated model with contemporaneous 
correlation and a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side.  The lagged dependent 
variable is a concern because its presence in a fixed effect model can generate parameter 
estimates that are biased up to 20% even when the number of time units is as high as 30 (Judson 
& Owen, 1999).   
Although the Monte Carlo evidence in Judson and Owen (1999) suggests that a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is preferable to a Least Squares Dummy 
Variables estimator (also known as a fixed-effects model) in the case of a dynamic panel data 
model it cannot be used when dummy variables are 0 for almost all or 1 for almost all 
observations (Roodman, 2009).  In this research most of the variables of interest are of this type 
resulting in a situation where a GMM estimator cannot be used.  The other common alternative, a 
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Parks-Kmenta estimator requires T ≥ N in the case of contemporaneous correlation, a situation 
that does not exist in this data.   
Thus, to obtain efficient and unbiased estimates, the original model, 
 yjt = β1Xjt + β2Zjt + υj + μt + εjt (1) 
 
is first differenced, 
 
 yjt - yjt-1 = β1Xjt + β2Zjt + υj + μt + εjt - β1Xjt-1 - β2Zjt-1 -  υj - μt-1 - εjt-1 (2) 
 
and when simplified, 
 
 yjt - yjt-1 = β1 (Xjt - Xjt-1) + β2 (Zjt - Zjt-1) + (μt - μt-1) + (εjt - εjt-1) (3) 
 
eliminates autocorrelation, explicit fixed effects, and the correlation of the lagged dependent 
variable with the disturbances.  Next, a panel corrected standard error estimator is applied to (3) 
to account for any panel level heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  This 
extension of White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors accounts for the panel 
structure of the data and in Monte Carlo simulations is more efficient than OLS standard errors 
(Beck & Katz, 1995).  To be clear, although the system has been first differenced, equations (1) 
and (3) show that the parameter interpretations are exactly the same as before first differencing.   
Results 
The nature of multiple league classifications and the associated hypotheses necessitates a 
model with a fairly large number of variables.  Yet, often more parsimonious models are equally 
informative.  Since one of the research questions involves the simple distinction between 
independent and affiliated teams, a simplified regression is first run with these variables and a 
single dummy for any new stadium in a market (see Model 1 in Table 4).  Neither affiliated nor 
independent teams are significant.                                                <insert Table 4 here> 
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Model 2 was run with a more detailed breakdown of affiliated teams to address the 
differences between classifications.  Model 3 tested this further stratification and a Wald test 
confirmed (p = 0.022) that the distinction between A+, A, and A- was significantly different 
from zero.  Therefore, Model 4 implemented this stratification at both the team and stadium 
level.  Finally, Model 5 added entry and exit honeymoons.  Model 5 is the fully specified model 
and is used for discussion, although the results are strongly similar between the various models.  
The R-squared value of 0.34 is lower than other similar major league research.  But, since R-
squared is simply the fraction of unexplained variance in the model, it seems unsurprising that 
238 minor league metro areas that range from a AAA metropolis to an Independent village have 
more natural random unexplained variability than 40 nearly identical major league metro areas. 
The first difference of the  rate of employment is statistically significant and in the 
expected direction.  The first difference of the percent change in population is negative 
suggesting, in this case, that the increasing labor supply is lowering wages.  Two other control 
variables, the first differences of stadium capacity and the quality of the major league parent 
club, are statistically insignificant.   
As mentioned in the previous section, although the model was first differenced, the 
parameter interpretations have not changed.  Thus, the mere presence of an AAA franchise is 
associated with a $67.25 (p = 0.034) increase in per capita incomes, holding all else constant.  
Similarly, an A+ franchise is associated with a $117.57 (p = 0.044) increase in per capita 
income.  The honeymoon period for stadiums at the AA (160.83, p = 0.033) and rookie level 
(201.99, p = 0.032) also have significant impacts on per capita income.  The entry and exit 
honeymoon variables are all insignificant.   
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Robustness Checks 
Because the positive effects of minor league teams and stadiums at various classifications 
are an unexpected outcome, three types of follow-up analyses were performed to ascertain the 
robustness of the results: removing variables from the fully specified model, adding variables to 
the fully specified model, and examining different samples of years and MSAs.  
Two control variables, stadium capacity and major league affiliate quality, are 
insignificant in the fully specified model.  Various modifications of major league affiliate quality 
were attempted including a three year moving average, only the previous season’s win percent, 
and distance to the parent club.  None of these controls for major league parent quality were 
significant.  In addition, the removal of both stadium capacity and MLB quality variables from 
Model 5 did not affect the final results (see Table 5).   
Similar to the insignificance of the control variables, a Wald test of the joint significance 
failed to reject the null that the entry and exit variables were collectively equal to zero (p = 
0.464).  Despite their individual and collective insignificance, their exclusion from the model did 
result in the AA stadium coefficient losing its significance. 
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable based on the notion of a product cycle is 
meant to capture the self-perpetuating tendencies of local industries and economies.  Because 
some economists view the use of a lagged dependent variable as theoretically tenuous, its 
exclusion from the model was investigated.  Both rookie and AA stadiums remained significant 
while AAA and A+ teams moved just beyond the 5% level of significance. <insert Table 5 here> 
In terms of adding variables to the fully specified model, controls for spring training 
facilities and college stadiums were tested.  Teams in Arizona and Florida on occasion use the 
same stadium as those used by major league teams for spring training.  It was theorized that these 
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arrangements might result in additional benefits.  The results were insignificant (p = 0.774).  
Likewise, some teams share facilities with local colleges and universities.  A dummy variable to 
capture these arrangements was also insignificant (p = 0.881). 
It should be noted that in all of the alternative specifications mentioned above, the other 
parameters not reported in Table 5 were essentially the same. 
The last category of robustness tests involves changing the sample.  Attendance was not 
included in the original model for several reasons, the most important of which was that 
attendance data for all affiliated teams started only in 1992, thus reducing the sample size 
considerably.  No significance was found on attendance when the sample began in 1992. 
Similarly, because the inclusion of entry and exit variables necessitated the removal of 
five years of data, their exclusion from the model allowed more data points.  Thus, when entry 
and exit were removed and the sample was extended from 1980 to 2006, AAA teams and rookie 
stadiums remained significant at p < 0.05 while A+ teams and AA stadiums performed less well 
but still remained significant at p < 0.10.   
In all of the new specifications, the AAA team and rookie stadium coefficients appear the 
most stable.  In fact, only the removal of the lagged dependent variable pushes the AAA team 
coefficient to its highest p value of 0.057.  
V. DISCUSSION 
The discussion of these results begins by addressing the issue of potential endogeneity.  It 
is certainly plausible that population and the presence of a team are related to per capita income.  
Indeed the popular press and our gut reactions tend to reinforce this belief.  But as in major 
league sports, teams move away when attendance and profits fall and they move to cities that 
offer them new stadiums.  But a new stadium is often a function of the local political landscape 
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(Fort, 1999) and does not necessarily imply that higher per capita incomes or larger populations 
increase the probability of obtaining a minor league team.  This is supported by the Wu-
Hausman test of the data which confirms no endogeneity problems. 
The only person to explicitly investigate the factors affecting minor league team location 
used an ordered logit model to predict which cities were more likely to have teams at different 
levels (Davis, 2006).  His results showed that personal income has a positive effect on the 
classification of the team in the city but he found the effect “surprising” (p. 263) and concluded 
the effect was of “secondary importance” (p. 260) to population.  Indeed, in Davis’ list of the 10 
AAA cities with the lowest probability of having a team, those cities have actually hosted AAA 
teams for an average of 35 years! This certainly calls into question the ability of the variables 
(including per capita income) in Davis’ model to accurately predict which cities are more likely 
to host a minor league baseball franchise.  This may be due to the history of minor league 
baseball; AAA and rookie franchises are extremely stable and  often began their tenure in cities 
over 20 years ago when the size and wealth of the city was significantly different than today. 
Further research is needed to deeply clarify the issue, but for the purposes of this 
research, there is enough evidence to suggest that endogeneity is not a problem in the current 
minor league data set.  Therefore, the results are discussed in terms of the concepts and theories 
that might explain why minor league baseball could lead to changes in per capita income. 
The positive effects of AAA teams, A+ teams, AA stadiums, and rookie stadiums on the 
change in local per capita income are the most unexpected results from this analysis.  As 
discussed above, the results for AAA teams and rookie stadiums are the most robust to 
alternative specifications and may be the most interesting outcomes of this inquiry.   
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What explains these positive results?  Conceptually, there are myriad reasons minor 
league teams might have a more negative effect on local economies than their major league 
counterparts do, including lower levels of national media exposure, shorter seasons, decreased 
league longevity, more frequent moves, seasonal employment, lack of national revenue sharing, 
and the small size of the business.  Although these are undeniable features of minor league 
baseball, they are simply descriptive features of the product.  It is faulty to assume they are 
sufficient to explain the relationship between the presence of a team and per capita income.   
Instead, there are a considerable number of well-established conditions, discussed in the 
Theory and Literature section, that could theoretically allow a minor league team to affect local 
income.  For instance, increased incomes can result if a team and its stadium generate new 
spending by out-of-area visitors, discourage residents from spending outside the local economy, 
have low levels of leakages, result in little or no crowding out effects, are located in a metro area 
that is geographically isolated, have high stadium utilization rates, build a new stadium instead of 
a replacement stadium, and locate the stadium in a central business district.  Thus, these 
conditions were compared with the raw data to draw some possible conclusions.  Each will be 
discussed below, in terms of the three primary objectives of the research. 
 
Differences within Minor League Baseball 
Teams 
Baade and Sanderson (1997a) suggested that teams that are more geographically isolated 
from other teams are likely to have a stronger regional following which will increase visitor 
spending.  At the AAA level, there are 34 MSAs that ever hosted an AAA team in the sample 
period, 14 of which also hosted a major league team in a sport besides baseball.  At the other end 
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of the spectrum, seven are geographically isolated with no major league team in any sport within 
a three hour drive.  In these MSAs, the nature of their isolation drives visitor spending as does 
the presence of their AAA team as the highest quality in-stadium baseball experience in the 
region.  Despite the fact that some minor league markets are home to popular university football 
and basketball programs, serious or casual fans seeking a live professional baseball experience 
have few or no other options in these markets.  For example, Rosentraub and Swindell (1991) 
report that the AAA team in Indianapolis (a city with two other professional teams) draws 60% 
of its attendees from out of the area suggesting that visitors are specifically searching for an in-
stadium baseball experience. 
In regard to the 14 AAA MSAs with both major and minor league teams, the major 
league experience may be so expensive that sports connoisseurs are drawn to the more 
affordable, yet still relatively high quality, AAA game.  Indeed, Gitter and Rhoads (2010) found 
that increasing ticket prices for major league teams within 100 miles of a minor league team led 
to increased minor league attendance.   
Although the presence of a team at the AAA or A+ level is associated with positive 
income effects, no team entry or exit dummy variables at any level are significant.  It seems that 
the smaller nature of minor league baseball diminishes any euphoria or despair effects associated 
with team entry and exit, respectively.  At first glance, it may appear odd that a presence variable 
is significant while the corresponding entry variable is not.  Yet, the entry variable is a 
honeymoon meant to capture the additional newness effect that often generates fanfare, interest, 
and attendance beyond the mere presence of the team.  The insignificance of the entry 
honeymoon simply means there are no effects beyond those already associated with the presence 
of the team. 
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Stadiums 
In terms of the positive effects associated with minor league stadiums, the results show a 
new stadium at the AA or rookie level is associated with an increase in the change in per capita 
income during the year the stadium was built and the four subsequent years.  Theoretically, 
stadiums are more likely to affect per capita income if they are associated with other urban 
redevelopment, have a high degree of utilization, and if they drive new visitor spending. 
Ultimately, it is hard to conceive that an AA stadium that draws an average of 3,837 
attendees 70 times a year or a rookie stadium that draws an average of 1,364 attendees 35 times a 
year could possibly generate enough economic activity to create a measurable effect in the scope 
of a larger regional economy.  The first reason these two classifications have positive stadium 
effects may be that these teams are more successful than others in utilizing the venue for 
activities that drive economic activity by drawing visitors from outside the local economy.  
When minor league ballparks are said to be built as community assets that host everything from 
high school marching band contests to minor league games, perhaps these are the markets where 
this holds true.  For example, Hunter Wright Stadium in Kingsport, TN is home to the rookie-
level Kingsport Mets.  The stadium hosts the Mets, a baseball team from Gate City High School 
in nearby Virginia, and the post-season tournaments for the Appalachian Athletic Conference 
and Region XII of the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.   
If the positive effect is not due to high venue utilization, then it may be related to urban 
redevelopment.  Johnson (1998) points out that the location of a stadium can assist in 
development by opening up industrial corridors, acting as the centerpiece of larger entertainment 
projects, opening up land for new development, or driving infrastructure for future growth.  
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Urban economists all recognize that stadiums themselves will not cause significant development, 
rather, in communities with specific development logics and successful action plans a stadium 
can serve as the driver for other development.  In this light, it is possible that AA and rookie 
MSAs have more successful redevelopment objectives. 
A third reason is related to publicity.  Johnson (1998) mentions that stadiums can also 
serve to improve a community’s image if successfully exploited by the Chamber of Commerce, 
local officials, tourist offices, economic development agencies, and other local government and 
business organizations.  When a large number of agencies act in concert to promote and market a 
team or its stadium it increases the opportunities for economic gain.  Thus, positive effects may 
also be due to successful promotion of a minor league team or stadium.  Rookie MSAs may be 
more likely to engage in this type of publicity since the team and stadium may be the only 
significant local attractions.  For example, the official website for the town of Pulaski, VA, lists a 
visit to historic Calfee Park as the number one item on its list of Things to Do.    
In addition to high venue utilization, stadiums as development devices, and high local 
publicity, there may be MSA-specific factors that induce the positive results.  Rookie MSAs are 
the stereotypical version of rural, small town America.  Virtually all are geographically isolated 
in deep Appalachian valleys or the open expanse of the rural west (Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, and 
Montana).   
In addition to their isolated nature, rookie-level teams tend to be very stable.  Team 
movements are rare and most teams have a long tenure in their MSAs.  These teams may in fact 
be the “only show in town” which suggests a high level of psychological identification and may 
explain why a new stadium generates such a powerful response.  Similar to the honeymoon 
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effect seen at major league parks, minor league fans and even the general public may be driven 
to these parks for several years out of curiosity, popularity, and word of mouth.   
 
Differences between Affiliated and Independent Leagues 
Neither independent teams nor stadiums exhibited significant effects.  These results are 
not unexpected.  Affiliated teams have a higher quality product, stronger team histories, 
increased team and league longevity, the branding benefits of affiliation, and more national 
media exposure.  All of these factors positively affect intent to purchase and new visitor 
spending. 
As a whole, independent teams are drastically less stable than affiliated teams leading to 
lower levels of regional interest, support, and visitor spending.  In the period from 1980 to 2006, 
independent teams stayed in an MSA an average of four years while affiliated franchises 
averaged sixteen years (see Table 1).  This is not to say that there aren’t shining examples of 
successful independent teams only that, as a whole, independent teams are not associated with 
gains in local area per capita income.  
 
Differences between Major and Minor League Baseball 
The bulk of academic inquiry has shown professional teams and stadiums have 
predominately insignificant effects on local incomes.  Therefore, the insignificance of the 
majority of independent variables at the minor league level is consistent with previous research 
at the major league level. 
This study used a model as similar as possible to Coates and Humphreys (1999) so that 
comparisons could be made between major and minor league sports.  Although the unique 
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structure of minor league baseball made it infeasible or impossible to include identical variables, 
many of the same ones were used.  In addition to a longer and more current dataset, this research 
took advantage of new techniques in panel data analysis and used a different estimator.   
Coates and Humphreys (1999) found insignificance for MLB stadium construction and 
entrance coefficients whereas the minor league coefficients are significant in four instances (see 
Table 6).  The effect size of a minor league team is small, ranging from 0.7% of MSA per capita 
income for a rookie stadium to 0.2% for an AAA team, but is similar to other minor league 
research (Gitter & Rhoads, 2010; Winfree, 2009) that has also found small but strongly 
significant effects. 
In terms of capacity, Coates and Humphreys (1999) found 1000 additional seats in a 
MLB stadium are associated with a small increase of $9.40 in real personal income.  At the 
minor league level, where stadium capacity is dramatically smaller than the major leagues, 1000 
additional seats results in a $5 to $6 decrease in real personal income.   
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Ultimately, the nature of minor league baseball teams and stadiums may be that they 
result in little or no crowding out effects, have low levels of leakages, and discourage residents 
from spending outside the local economy.  The small scale nature of minor league baseball 
almost certainly guarantees little or no crowding out effects in local tourism establishments (e.g. 
hotels) and minimal local crowding out effects in terms of locals changing travel and spending 
habits to avoid pre- and post-game crowds2. 
                                                 
2 Yet a reviewer rightly points out that no research has yet confirmed whether this is true 
so it is plausible for very small towns to experience crowding out, even with low attendance 
numbers. 
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Minor league teams and stadiums may cause few leakages for two different reasons.  
First, minor league baseball salaries are so low that most players earn enough for basic 
sustenance so that little if any leaves the local economy.  Second, in cases of rural towns and 
geographic isolation, the presence of a team or stadium may actually discourage residents from 
spending outside the local economy.  If minor league baseball is one of only a few local 
entertainment options, having a team may inspire residents to stay and enjoy their leisure locally 
as opposed to traveling away to find another alternative.  In fact, other local entertainment 
options such as movies most certainly have a higher propensity to leak than does minor league 
baseball. 
Although this research was not specifically designed to explain why minor league teams 
and stadiums might have positive effects on local incomes, the raw data provides a fascinating 
pool of possible explanations and opens the door for further research to answer the many 
lingering questions as to why minor league teams and stadiums at some levels might be associated with 
increases in per capita income. 
 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The results of this research highlight the positive effects of AAA teams, A+ teams, AA 
stadiums, and rookie stadiums on local per capita income.  The findings also indicate non-
positive effects of AA, A, A-, rookie, and independent teams as well as AAA, A+, A, A-, and 
independent stadiums.   
There are several reasons the positive effects are particularly interesting.  First, and in 
contrast to decades of major league results, there are no significant negative effects.  All of the 
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significant results are positive.  In addition, the a priori expectations based on a thorough 
conceptual analysis were that all of the results would be negative.    
To be clear, teams and stadiums in the majority of classifications have insignificant 
effects on per capita income.  This is consistent with prior major league research.  What is 
unique about the minor league context is that entire leagues of teams at the AAA and A+ levels 
are, for the first time, reflecting positive changes.  Yet, no cost-benefit analysis was conducted so 
there is no implication that cities should invest in AA or rookie stadiums.  What is distinctive 
about these results is the acknowledgement that perhaps fundamental differences in the business 
structure of sports can result in dramatic changes in the ability of sports teams to affect their 
local economies. 
Considerable work is still necessary to refine our understanding of the effects of minor 
league sports on local economies.  The positive effect of some classifications of minor league 
baseball may not be unique to the sport of baseball.  Minor leagues in hockey are nearly as 
extensive and may well generate similar effects.   European leagues that operate on promotion 
and relegation have even more “minor” leagues.  English football, for example, has over 140 
leagues in over 20 different levels.  Many of these teams are located in cities not dissimilar to 
minor league baseball cities, suggesting a positive effect may exist there as well.  Other 
academicians are encouraged to further pursue this line of research.  
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TABLE 1  
Franchise Volatility as Measured by the Number of Years in an MSA 
Affiliated Classification 
  AAA AA A+ A A- R IND
Mean 17.23 13.57 18.76 15.64 15.06 16.85 4.61
Standard Error 1.53 1.19 1.44 1.24 1.37 2.01 0.33
Median 19 12 20 14 15 18 3
Minimum 1 2 1 1 1 3 1
Maximum 27 27 27 27 27 27 14
Note. All minor league teams in the 27 year period between 1980 and 2006. 
a Excludes minor league teams playing in far suburbs of very large MSAs that are not reflective of their 
true market size. 
 
TABLE 2 
MSA Characteristics by Minor League Baseball Classification, 2006 
 
  Average populationa 
% playing in 
cities with any 
major league 
team 
% playing in 
cities with a 
MLB team 
Average 
stadium 
age (years) 
Average 
stadium 
seating 
capacity 
Average 
games played 
per season 
MLB 5,794,493 100% 100% 23 44,774 161 
AAA 1,188,280 38% 3% 21 12,773 143 
AA 569,885 11% 4% 16 7,519 140 
All A's 466,078 19% 16% 26 5,477 117 
   A+ 516,165 20% 15% 33 5,784 138 
   A 426,144 13% 10% 20 5,849 138 
   A- 455,925 24% 24% 26 4,799 75 
Rookie 171,694 0% 0% 32 3,382 72 
Ind. 632,672 33% 33% 28 4,995 na 
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TABLE 3  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable 
Real per capita income (2006) 27393.82 5226.83 12782 74281
Local Market Variables 
Lagged real per capita income (2006) 27037.37 5122.35 12617 71042
Percent change in population 0.010150 0.013871 -0.244 0.105
Rate of employment 0.471758 0.070982 0.234 0.663
Stadium capacity 4074.781 5570.446 0 76273
Quality of MLB affiliation 1410783 2288318 0 15600000
Number of NFL franchises  0.0365 0.187495 0 1
Number of NBA franchises 0.0372 0.189373 0 1
Number of NHL franchises 0.0174 0.130694 0 1
Number of MLB franchises 0.0170 0.129275 0 1
Minor League Variables 
Number of affiliated franchises 0.5342 0.547440 0 3
Number of AAA franchises 0.0984 0.297826 0 1
Number of AA franchises 0.1083 0.310774 0 1
Number of A franchises (all) 0.2595 0.449190 0 3
   Number of A+ franchises 0.0817 0.286271 0 3
   Number of A franchises 0.1054 0.307128 0 1
   Number of A- franchises 0.0724 0.264256 0 2
Number of rookie franchises 0.0680 0.295718 0 2
Number of independent franchises 0.0930 0.295042 0 3
Any stadium honeymoon 0.0252 0.156778 0 1
AAA stadium honeymoon 0.0206 0.142144 0 1
AA stadium honeymoon 0.0244 0.154444 0 1
All A stadium honeymoon 0.0372 0.189373 0 1
   A+ stadium honeymoon 0.0094 0.096294 0 1
   A stadium honeymoon 0.0204 0.141498 0 1
   A- stadium honeymoon 0.0074 0.085991 0 1
Rookie stadium honeymoon 0.0078 0.088151 0 1
Independent stadium honeymoon 0.0118 0.108181 0 1
AAA entry honeymoon 0.0138 0.116467 0 1
AA entry honeymoon 0.0235 0.151472 0 1
A entry honeymoon 0.0487 0.215263 0 1
Rookie entry honeymoon 0.0143 0.118834 0 1
Independent entry honeymoon 0.0676 0.251098 0 1
AAA exit honeymoon 0.0099 0.099169 0 1
AA exit honeymoon 0.0229 0.149657 0 1
A exit honeymoon 0.0414 0.199334 0 1
Rookie exit honeymoon 0.0071 0.083773 0 1
Independent exit honeymoon 0.0737 0.261340 0 1
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Note. Although the model is first-differenced before estimation, the un-differenced values are reported here 
since the interpretation of the coefficients is the same regardless of first-differencing, as described 
in the Analysis section. 
TABLE 4 
Effects of the Presence of Minor League Baseball Teams on Per Capita Income, 1985-
2006 
 Model   
First-differenced variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Lagged real per capita income -0.1269* -0.1279* -0.1297* -0.1305* -0.1315* 
0.060 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.059 
Percent change in population -11278.4*** -11244.1*** -11139.6*** -11148.5*** -11124.8*** 
3336.283 3332.758 3319.176 3316.134 3311.445 
Rate of employment 41067.55*** 41105.41*** 41323.91*** 41335.76*** 41401.12*** 
2759.098 2745.166 2730.243 2715.703 2703.199 
Stadium capacity -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0061 -0.0064 
0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 
Quality of MLB affiliation 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.000001 0.000002 
0.000008 0.000008 0.000008 0.000008 0.000008 
Number of NFL franchises  -8.044 -20.685 -13.781 -14.222 -22.505 
140.393 141.631 140.911 140.589 141.754 
Number of NBA franchises 69.481 55.120 50.738 52.721 60.424 
63.364 62.313 62.100 61.945 63.658 
Number of NHL franchises 33.635 30.440 16.182 13.709 13.350 
102.373 102.925 102.528 102.417 102.991 
Number of MLB franchises 151.260 170.490 172.485 172.769 182.462 
91.157 92.734 93.425 93.419 94.881 
Number of affiliated franchises 35.099 
21.495 
Number of AAA franchises 65.016* 66.031* 70.486* 67.245* 
30.412 30.237 32.652 31.781 
Number of AA franchises 78.482* 75.327* 55.270 60.789 
35.048 34.188 35.840 37.122 
Number of A franchises (all) 28.013 
22.252 
Number of A+ franchises 110.088 123.626* 117.567* 
57.337 59.092 58.320 
Number of A franchises 9.380 -2.548 -12.375 
29.936 32.723 34.794 
Number of A- franchises -45.233 -43.859 -52.268 
33.042 33.676 33.796 
Number of rookie franchises -9.351 -10.374 -28.504 -22.967 
33.835 33.693 35.278 35.134 
Number of ind. franchises 29.010 30.605 29.928 22.359 -19.604 
44.716 44.848 44.839 45.318 76.387 
Any stadium honeymoon 3.662 1.606 2.278 
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 Model   
First-differenced variables 1 2 3 4 5 
54.564 54.546 54.618 
AAA stadium honeymoon -16.238 -2.897 
89.445 113.605 
AA stadium honeymoon 95.367 160.828* 
57.975 75.279 
A+ stadium honeymoon -94.691 -110.886 
57.975 75.279 
A stadium honeymoon 68.287 56.599 
50.170 52.108 
A- stadium honeymoon -2.923 -14.511 
73.721 74.547 
Rookie stadium honeymoon 179.708* 201.992* 
88.020 93.954 
Ind. stadium honeymoon 71.508 53.510 
103.974 99.734 
AAA entry honeymoon -22.145 
151.672 
AA entry honeymoon -115.007 
77.547 
A entry honeymoon 24.710 
35.627 
Rookie entry honeymoon -49.552 
71.528 
Independent entry honeymoon 55.081 
97.399 
AAA exit honeymoon -36.588 
77.173 
AA exit honeymoon 51.987 
52.223 
A exit honeymoon -34.962 
39.095 
Rookie exit honeymoon -156.032 
91.280 
Independent exit honeymoon -14.154 
50.384 
R2 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Observations 5,236 5,236 5,236 5,236 5,236 
Note. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are below the estimated coefficients.  
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
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TABLE 5 
Robustness Check for Four Significant Minor League Variables 
AAA Team A+ Team AA Stadium Rookie Stadium
Original Sample 
Fully Specified         67.245* 117.567* 160.828* 201.992*
(Model 5) 31.781 58.320 75.279 93.954
Without Capacity and  67.771* 117.597* 159.6239* 203.407*
MLB Quality 31.773 58.263 75.290 93.979
Without Entry and Exit 70.486* 123.626* 95.367 179.708*
32.652 59.092 57.975 88.020
Without Lagged  62.100 110.531 148.38474* 203.885*
Dependent Variable 32.646 57.831 72.882 93.889
Different Sample 
Without Entry and Exit  67.915* 86.355 95.827 182.664*
1980-2006 28.497 49.811 51.594 85.750
With Attendance    95.088* 101.514 238.895 158.362
1992-2006 39.703 85.158 131.686 119.846
Note. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are below the estimated coefficients.  
* Significant at 5% 
 
TABLE 6 
Summary of the Effects of Major and Minor League Baseball on Real Per Capita Income 
 
  Stadium Team 
MLB -- -- 
AAA -- +,  p < 0.05 
AA +,  p < 0.05 -- 
All A's -- -- 
   A+ -- +,  p < 0.05 
   A -- -- 
   A- -- -- 
Rookie +,  p < 0.05 -- 
Ind. -- -- 
Note. Major league results from Coates and Humphreys (1999).  Insignificance noted by --. 
